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COMMUNICATION AND DECISION AIDS 
FDR NUCLEAR ACCIDENT WAGEMENT: 
PLANNING TO DEAL WITH UNCERTAINTY 
John W. Lathrop 
Ths  article examines some of the communication and decision prob- 
lems involved in the management of an accident at  a nuclear reactor. 
The words accident management here mean the supervision of the 
actions taken to  mitlgate the effects of an accident after it as begun and 
has been recognized. The purpose of t h s  article is to propose a new 
approach to aiding communication and decision making in the midst of 
the confusion and uncertainty that may pervade the next nuclear 
accident. That approach is concerned with the type of information com- 
municated, not with communication hardware. Specifically, the proposed 
approach provides a systematic way to encode the information that must 
be passed from the technical personnel assessing the status of the reac- 
tor to the political authorities making decisions concerning population 
protection countermeasures. 
The line of reasoning developed here is based on a particular defini- 
tion of nuclear accident: 
a n  occurrence a t  a nuclear reactor where for some period of 
time there is a significant probability of an  immediate or future 
release of nuclear material. Sgnificant probability here means a 
probability high enough that there is or should be consideration 
of off-site population protection measures, such as evacuation. 
This definition is a t  variance with the common idea of a nuclear accident, 
which involves some rapid progression of unfortunate events that is 
understood well enough to allow non-probabilistic projections of off-site 
doses (see for example IAEA 1979). The probabilistic nature of the above 
definition reflects the basic idea that motivates this paper: In the course 
of a nuclear accident, accident management decisions may have to be 
made on the  basis of very incomplete information, so plans should be 
designed to  aid accident managers in making decisions under uncer- 
tainty. 
The probabilistic nature of the definition used here follows from the 
experience a t  Three Mile Island (TMI). Of course, lessons learned from 
TMI should be treated with great caution, as the next accident will not be 
the same. Yet the TM1 event revealed a type of nuclear accident not anti- 
cipated in the emergency plans: a confusing, slowly developing accident 
with a great  deal of uncertainty about current and future plant status in 
the course of the accident. One of the most significant aspects of the 
accident at  TMI was the very slowly evolving state of information regard- 
ing the actual state of the plant (Dieckamp 1981a). This led to long 
periods of time during wbch  decision makers did not know-whether or 
not a release was about to  occur, but only had some unexpressed proba- 
bility distribution over possible events. Yet accident management deci- 
sions could not wait for all uncertainties to be resolved. Decisions had to  
be made in the face of great uncertainty. 
It seems clear from the  reports of the Kemeny and Rogovin commis- 
sions that  existing accident management plans were not adequate to  han- 
dle the confusion and uncertainty encountered a t  TUI (Kemeny 1979; 
Rogovin 1980). Yet why was an accident like TMI not anticipated in those 
plans? The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) investgation by the  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement (NRC 1979a) cites as one reason the 
fact that emergency planning was geared to those particular types of 
major accidents where events occur very quickly. Herman Dieckamp, 
President of the parent company of the utility operating TMI, has pointed 
out the problems of accident management plans being too narrowly con- 
strained by preconceived notions of what an accident is going to  look like 
(Dieckamp 19Blb). That seems to have been the case at  TMT. 
These points relate to a fundamental problem of planning for nuclear 
accidents: they are very rare.  That fact leads to several difficulties: 
there is no frequentistic basis for planning, it is difficult to envision the 
range of different accidents that  are possible, and i t  is even more difficult 
t o  assess the adequacy of the accident management plans and prepared- 
ness. A more subtle difficulty in planning for such rare events is that  past 
accidents are thoroughly studied, and so are well understood, in retros- 
pect .  Plans and preparedness drills may be oriented toward such well- 
understood accidents, and so are not adequate to  deal with an  accident 
that  is very poorly understood during its first stages. Once again, that  
seems to have been the case at T M I .  
The central theme of this paper follows from the above paragraphs: 
Nuclear accident management plans must be made more resilient to the 
confusion and uncertainty that may be encountered in the course of an 
actual, poorly understood accident. The remainder of the paper 
describes one strategy for increasing that resilience. 
THE PROBLEM 
One of the most important effects of a poor understanding of an 
accident situation is a lack of summary descriptors of the plant status. 
Without such descriptors, communication of plant status becomes time- 
consuming and complicated, and the information-processing load on 
those involved in accident management is much higher than i t  would be 
for a well-understood accident. The Rogovin report (1980) was quite criti- 
cal of failures to comprehend and communicate a t  TMI: 
... the inability of the utility's management to comprehend the 
severity of the accident and communicate it to the NRC and the 
public was a serious failure of the company's management .... 
Moreover, NRC and B&W [Babcock & Wilcox] employees in the 
control room also did not recognize or communicate critical 
information. And their offsite organizations did no better, and 
perhaps worse, than the utility's offsite engineers at GPU [Gen- 
eral Public Utilities] in New Jersey in demanding reporting of 
important information and in rcognizing the significance of the 
information that they did receive. The ... NRC and B&W did no 
better than Met Ed [Metropolitan Edison]/GPU in reporting crit 
cal information up the management chain and acting upon it.. .. i- 
l ~ a b c o c k  & Wilcox (B&W) is the steam supply vendor for TMI. Metropolitan Edison (Met Ed) is 
the utility operating TMI. General Public Utilities (GPU) is the  parent company of Met Ed, 
headquartered in New Jersey. 
Clearly, communications were a serious problem at  TMI,  largely because 
the  plant status was not well understood. There were no summary 
descriptors that could be used to  describe the technical situation. 
It follows from these considerations that  accident management plans 
should be designed to  help participants cope with and convey very uncer- 
tain, poorly understood situations. Plans should anticipate and pre-digest 
as  many decisions as possible, so tha t  real-time decision-making 
resources can be reserved for the completely unexpected aspects of the  
accident. There are several communication and decision problems 
involved in accident management, of course. This paper will focus on one 
of the  more intriguing problems: communication of the  accident situa- 
tion from technical people on site to government authorities off site, in 
support of decisions concerning w hch  population protection measures to  
employ where. Clearly, this communication and decision problem is vital 
to  successful accident management. Just as clearly, this aspect of the 
TMI accident left much to be desired, as indicated in the quote from the 
Rogovin report presented above. 
While the basic elements of nuclear accident management are actu- 
ally rather simple, the decision-making dilemmas that  they generate can 
be very difficult. The best way to  structure the on-site/off-site communi- 
cation and decision problem is to characterize the decisions required. 
The off-site government authorities must decide w hch  population protec- 
tion measures, if any, to implement, and where to  implement them (out 
to  what radius, in w h c h  sector). Possible protective measures, referred 
to  as countermeasures, include advising people to stay indoors (shelter), 
advising people to leave (evacuation), or issuing radioprotective 
medication to prevent intake of radio-iodine by the thyroid (IAEA 1979). 
The accident situation represents a possibility of radiation exposure 
to the population. However, because of uncertain plant status, meteoro- 
logical conditions, etc. ,  typically no one in the midst of an accident can 
predict with any certainty what population dose will result. On the other 
hand, the countermeasures themselves entail risk. People can get killed 
during an evacuation. There are rare  negative side effects to radiopro- 
tective medication. There a re  also political and financial costs associated 
with executing a countermeasure. There are even negative effects to the 
population caused by the information concerning an accident and the 
consideration of countermeasures. The Kemeny Commission concluded 
that  the most serious health effect of TMI to the population was the men- 
tal distress (Kemeny 1979). It follows that  accident management decision 
making must balance the risks of an  uncertain radiation exposure if no 
countermeasure is ordered with the uncertain costs and risks of ordering 
a countermeasure which will only reduce, not eliminate, the risk of radia- 
tion exposure. The Kemeny Commission conclusion suggests that  
accident managers should even consider the effects on the public of inde- 
cision. 
The balancing of costs and risks between ordering and not ordering a 
countermeasure is only part of the problem of nuclear accident manage- 
ment. A second important part is that no one person can have a full 
appreciation of all of those costs and risks. It takes people with technical 
backgrounds and familiarity with the reactor to  assess plant status and 
gain an  appreciation of the lke lhood  of a radiological release. It takes 
people with legitimate government authority to make the difficult trade- 
offs between the costs and benefits of various countermeasures, to order 
their execution, and accept responsibility for the consequences. Yet the 
technical people typically do not have government authority, and the 
governmental authorities cannot be expected to have the technical 
expertise and familiarity with the plant. In short,  knowledge necessary to 
make responsible accident management decisions is divided between two 
groups of people. Clearly, good communications between these two 
groups is paramount. That communication would be difficult enough 
when an accident is well understood. When an accident is poorly under- 
stood, as was the case for the first days a t  TMI, it becomes extremely 
challenging to convey the state of knowledge about the situation to the 
government authorities in such a way that  sound accident management 
decisions can be made. 
An example accident management problem may help bring some of 
the points raised here into focus, and introduce the idea of probabilistic 
information in on-site/off-site communication. Consider a nuclear reac- 
tor sited near a large city. According to the figures of Dr. Jan Beyea in a 
report made to the New York City Council (see Sugarman !979), literally 
thousands of latent cancer deaths in New York City could result from a 
severe core-melt accident at  the  Indian Point reactor. Dr. Beyea's figures 
make it clear that  there could be accident scenarios where evacuation of 
parts of nearby cities could be called for. The long time required to exe- 
cute a n  evacuation would mean that it would not be desirable to wait until 
a large atmospheric release was certain before ordering an evacuation. 
Yet there would be a perhaps high cost in lives and property for ordering 
an unnecessary evacuation. There is a very clear need in thls case for 
communicating probabilistic information to government authorities. For 
example, in the early stages of an accident, with several anomalies in 
plant status indicators, the operators could judge that there is a 5% 
chance of a large release, but that  no appreciable release could happen 
for a t  least two hours. That information could be passed to the off-site 
government authorities to be used in their determination of whether or 
not to order an evacuation. However, the use of such information in 
accident management decisions requires a careful balancing of the socie- 
tal costs and benefits of evacuating and not evacuating, a process that  
would'best be  performed as much as possible in anticipation of an  
accident, rather than in the stressful and limited time during an  
accident. For example, the government authorities could have deter- 
mined in its planning procedures that, given that day's meteorological 
state,  an  evacuation would definitely be called for if the probability of 
large release exceeds 3% with a t  last two hours warning. It could also 
have been determined that if that probability falls between 1 and 3%, dis- 
cretionary factors such as the weather or various political pressures 
could be allowed to affect the decision between ordering an evacuation 
and issuing a warning to prepare to seek shelter. Finally, any probability 
less than 1% would mean that the risks of an  evacuation would definitely 
be greater than the risks of riding out the accident situation with a popu- 
lation prepared to seek shelter, at  least for the time being. 
The above example illustrates the need for probabilistic information 
in accident management communication, and the desirability of antici- 
pating how best to react to that probabilistic information. The example 
does not address the difficulties of generating that mformation. Wtule 
several of those difliculties are discussed later,  one particular problem in 
information generation is best discussed now. Note that  in the example 
the 5% probability was enough to call for an evacuation. That means that  
while an evacuation would definitely be ordered, there is a 95% chance 
that  it would turn out to be unnecessary. Realistically examining the 
risks and benefits facing the individual operator, is it reasonable to  
expect him to sound that  5% alarm? Perhaps a n  operator would view the  
situation as a 95% chance of ridicule and lost career  opportunities. Simi- 
lar arguments could apply to each individual decision maker  in the  chain. 
This section has described a challenging problem and opportunity for 
creative engineering: the development of a communication and decision 
aid system to support the on-site/off-site accident management problem. 
Such a system should be resilient to the confusion and uncertainty of a 
nuclear accident. I t  should be usable by people under a great  deal of 
stress. It should overcome possible resistance to its use by both on-site 
technical personnel and off-site government authorities. It  would be easy 
to se t  up the mechanics of such a system. A simple dedicated telephone 
line would do. The challenge is to develop a communication and decision 
system to ensure tha t  that  phone line is appropriately used. The follow- 
ing sections review the current  status of accident management plans 
regardmg this problem, outline possible forms for such a communication 
and decision system, and describe the necessary next steps in the 
development of that  system. 
CURRENT EMERGENCY PLANS 
Accident management plans as currently set up typically do not han- 
dle confusion and uncertainty well. The IAEA guide for off-site response 
plans ( M A  1979) charges the operator with the responsibility of predict- 
ing off-site consequences and informing off-site authorities of that  p rebc-  
tion without considering problems of effectively communicating the risks 
of the situation when the operator is very uncertain about the status of 
the reactor. This fits in with a typical pattern adopted for accident 
management plans, involving the setting of bounds on measured, antici- 
pated or projected individual radiation doses that could be caused by the 
accident. Those bounds are  to  be used as at  least partial guidance in 
recommending countermeasures. A review of papers presented a t  an 
international workshop on nuclear accident management reveals several 
examples of dose-based countermeasure guidelines from European coun- 
tries (see Clarke and Webb 1981, von Gadow 1981, and Beskrestnov 1981). 
One such guideline from the U.S. can be found in the Environmental Pro- 
tection Agency's Protective Action Guides (EPA 19?5), which call for man- 
datory evacuation if dose is to exceed 5 rern whole body (anticipated 
maximum individual dose). As  Clarke points out in the paper cited above, 
such a guideline represents a balancing of radiation risks versus the risks 
of the  countermeasure itself. However, it is not clear how such a guide- 
line would help in an accident where there is a great  deal of uncertainty 
regarding the status of the reactor. For example, how would such a 
guideline have helped a decision maker a t  TMI late on March 30, 1979, who 
knew only that  there was a hydrogen bubble in the  reactor vessel, that its 
flammability was still being calculated/argued, that it might explode and 
cause major releases of radiation? Where is the anticipated maximum 
in&vidual dose in that  sentence? There is none, though some probability 
distribution over such a dose is implied. Of course, as it turned out the 
hydrogen bubble could not have exploded, but the decision maker did not 
know that  a t  the time. How was he supposed to use the  5 rem guideline 
when faced with such uncertainty? It could be argued that  "maximum 
individual dose" presumes some maximum accident occurring. But with 
that  logic the 5 rem guideline could be exceeded whenever the plant is in 
an  off-normal mode. Clearly, accident management guidelines should be 
linked more directly to the  information the decision maker is actually apt 
to have available in the course of an  accident. 
The Protective Action Guides (PAGs) do leave room for judgment dur- 
ing an accident. For example, while evacuation is deemed mandatory for 
anticipated maximum individual whole body dose exceeding 5 rem, if that  
dose is between 1 and 5 rem,  ordering an evacuation is subject to the' dis- 
cretion'of the government authorities, and can depend on existing con- 
straints (weather, etc.).  In t h s  respect, the PAGs are  similar to the pro- 
babilistic guidance numbers given in the example above: mandatory eva- 
cuation if the probability of large release exceeds 3%, discretionary eva- 
cuation if that  probability lies between 1 and 3%. T h s  parallel forms a 
very clear contrast between the two concepts of countermeasure gui- 
dance: the PAGs are based on anticipated dose, the probabilistic gui- 
dance is based on probability of release. The incomplete state of infor- 
mation the operator is apt  to have in the course of a poorly understood 
accident is much more closely represented by the number 
than the anticipated dose number. While it may be difficult for an opera- 
tor to think in terms of probabilities, that  probabilistic information could 
be transformed into a more usable form, as discussed below. 
A different strategy for communicating a poorly understood reactor 
status can be found in the NRC's Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines 
for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0610, NRC 1979b), which effectively 
stipulates that the operator should call off-site authorities within fifteen 
minutes if he finds he is confused about the status of the reactor. Whle 
that  is a step in the right direction, in that it provides for communication 
even when the operator cannot predict the course of an accident, it does 
not provide for communication of the operator's uncertain state of 
knowledge in any structured way. It also raises the problem of the 
operator's willingness to actually make such a call. 
The Emergency Action Level Guidelines referred to above form part  
of the Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency 
Response Plans (NUREG-0654, NRC-FEMA 1980). Both the Criteria and 
Guidelines are very valuable bases for emergency plans, in that  they set  
up a graded scale of emergencies, each calling for a different level of 
response from off-site authorities (various levels of readiness, advice to 
take shelter, etc.).  However, they still call for the operator to make 
release and dose projections without giving h m  a systematic way to  com- 
municate a very uncertain reactor status. In addition, these documents 
call upon the operator to effectively make recommendations concerning 
what off-site countermeasures to employ where. This may be one way to  
communicate the operator's estimate of the seriousness of the accident, 
but it ignores the on-site/off-site division of expertise and authority 
referred to previously, and does not bear much resemblance to how coun- 
termeasure decisions were actually made at TMI, involving many phone 
calls and consultations between off-site authorities. 
The preceding section established the critical importance of com- 
municating the seriousness of a nuclear accident situation from on-site 
technical experts to off-site government authorities. Accident manage- 
ment systems that base that communication on dose projections or 
dose-based countermeasure recommendations are not adequate to 
manage situations where there is important uncertainty about the status 
of the reactor. Such systems do not handle the problem of portraying an 
uncertain situation, such as the hydrogen bubble problem at TMI. Whlle 
such systems could handle a hypothetical, well-understood accident, they 
are not resilient to confusion, and so fail to deal with problems that can 
arise in the course of an actual, poorly understood accident. 
The NRC and the nuclear industry are correct in continuing their 
search for better and better indicators of accident status. However, 
accident planners must acknowledge the fact that it is impossible to anti- 
cipate all accidents. Accident managers must be prepared for the fact 
that the next major accident may be just as confusing as TMI. It follows 
that emergency plans must include systems to communicate information 
about uncertain accident situations from technical experts on site to 
government authorities off site in such a way that sound accident 
management decisions can be made. Such a system must make com- 
munication of probabilistic information feasible in the midst of the confu- 
sion and stress of an accident situation; it must be effective in transmit- 
ting information from an operator who may face personal incentives to 
choose a course of action different from the one in the best interest of 
society. The next section presents one possible basis for such a commun- 
ication system. 
PROBABILTSTIC COMMUNICATION SYETEXS 
A n  Idea l i z ed  System 
T h s  paper deals with communication systems; not with the electron- 
ics, but with the type of information communicated. The easiest way to 
characterize the sort of information called for is to  start  by describing 
the state of knowledge that ,  ideally, should be transmitted from operator 
to authority. One way to represent that  s tate of knowledge is in terms of 
subjective probabilities that  each of one or two particular dose levels ( to  
the most exposed individual) will be exceeded a t  each of several different 
times in the near future. Table I presents an example idealized transmis- 
sion. 
Table I: Probabilistic Information on Near-Future Radiological Hazard 
time after present: t - - .5hr l h r  2hr 4hr 
* Probability that dose to most exposed (off-site) individual will exceed 10 
rem,  during time period starting with time t and ending with time 2t after 
present. 
The form of transmission represented in Table I is desirable in that  it 
represents the operator's incomplete state of knowledge about the reac- 
tor in terms that  are most relevant to countermeasure decisions, without 
cluttering the channel with technical details of no use to the off-site 
authorities. The probabilities in Table I are the  very numbers off-site 
authorities would need to plug into any formal or  informal societal 
risk/benefit calculations they would be making in weighing whether or 
not to order a n  evacuation. Perhaps different dose levels or times would 
be preferable as row and column descriptors, o r  perhaps numbers of 
latent fatalities and thyroid operations would be more relevant measures 
of radiation loss than dose to the most exposed individual. In any case, 
this idealized transmission form would involve a table of radiation loss 
level vs. time, with as cell entries probabilities (or odds) that  each radia- 
tion loss level will be exceeded a t  each time. Ideally, the operator or 
technical experts could express their state of knowledge concerning plant 
status in terms of t h s  set  of probabilities. The government authorities 
could then use them as bases for their countermeasure decisions. Natur- 
ally, the technical people would be given training on generating such sets 
of probabilities, and the government people would be trained in how to 
translate such probabilities into guides for their decisions. 
The communication scheme just described, simple enough on paper, 
probably would not work very well in an accident situation, for two very 
important reasons: 
i) in the midst of an accident, where each member of an operator 
team is under a heavy information-processing load and a great 
deal of stress, it doubtful that  any of them could meaningfully 
determine a set  of subjective probabilities, and 
ii) even with the help of extensive training, government authorities 
cannot be expected to be comfortable and facile enough with 
subjective probabilities to combine such information appropri- 
ately with social and political value information to come to  an 
appropriate countermeasure decision in the midst of the stress 
and political pressure of a nuclear accident. 
A Practical System: the Standard Language System 
The problem outlined above with the idealized communication sys- 
tem can be avoided by substituting keywords (or colors, "condition red," 
or numbers) from a very coarse, pre-determined standard language in 
place of the sets of subjective probabilities. A keyword would be substi- 
tuted for each column of subjective probabilities in Table 1, or perhaps 
one keyword would be used in place of the entire table. The standard 
language would have a limited vocabulary of from three to ten keywords, 
each associated with a corresponding standard paragraph describing the 
hazard presented by the accident situation. In the discussion below, the 
standard language is referred to  with the notation [K1, ... Kn], where each 
element Ki is a keyword paired with a paragraph, with higher-subscript 
values denoting keywords and paragraphs describing more hazardous 
situations. 
The idea of a standard language is not entirely incompatible with the 
se t  of emergency action levels (EALS) described in NUREG-0610 (NRC 
1979b). That se t  could be considered a four-element standard language: 
[Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Emergency, General Emer- 
gency]. However, the EAL descriptions lack any information explicitly 
describing the probability that  any particular radiological loss will be 
exceeded, they lack any information explicitly relating such probabilities 
to time of occurrence, they are rather coarse in that only the two hghes t  
levels involve appreciable off-site risk, and they lack detail in mapping 
from keyword to countermeasure decision guidance concerning evacua- 
tions. 
While in the  following discussion the language will always be referred 
to as being used by the operator or operator-team, in a longer-term 
accident the responsibility for determining the appropriate keywords 
could s h f t  to technical support staff. 
Requirements, Aspects of the Standard Language Sys tem 
Ideally the Standard Language System (SLS) would induce the  opera- 
tor to move from very coarse aspects of system status to a particular 
paragraph and keyword. For t h s  purpose, the mapping from system 
status to paragraph and keyword must  be as unambiguous as  possible. 
The operator could then be held liable if, for instance, he transmits a par- 
ticular plant s tatus,  K2, when it was unambiguously K3, since post- 
accident hearings could reasonably determine tha t  he should have used 
Kg. The SLS also relieves the operator of some of h s  responsibility, in 
tha t  he can refer to the mapping guidelines as a justification for his 
actions. Using the SLS, he is called upon to exercise his judgment less in 
the stress of a n  accident, and can benefit from the more considered judg- 
ments of the planners who developed the mapping from system status to 
paragraphs. 
Ideally, the SLS would also induce the government authority to ac t  
upon the keyword and paragraph received with a particular countermeas- 
ure. Given the keyword received and extenuating circumstances, the 
authority must feel tha t  only one or  two countermeasures could be justi- 
fied in post-accident hearings. The authority is also relieved of some of 
its responsibility, since it can cite the keyword given as partial justifica- 
tion of the  decision. Once again, a mapping from keywords to decision 
guidelines can be largely developed in the course of emergency planning, 
so tha t  decision tasks tha t  would have to be performed in the stress of an 
accident are replaced by more carefully considered judgments made in 
anticipation of an accident. 
B e n e f d s  of t h e  S t a n d a r d  Language  System 
The above requirements call for the SLS to have as unambiguous as 
possible a mapping from system status to paragraph and a reasonably 
clear mapping from paragraph and extenuating circumstances to  particu- 
lar countermeasure. T h s  raises the possibility of a more direct language, 
mapping straight from system status to countermeasure. Yet the inter- 
mediate nature for the SLS presented above is preferable to a more 
direct language, because i t  divides responsibility between the  operator 
and the government authority in an  advantageous way. This divlsion of 
labor by the intermediate SLS leaves the operator with a relatively techn- 
ical judgment and thus less prone to bias his estimate in the light of 
potential non-technical consequences. Conversely, the government 
authority, left with a relatively non-technical judgment, is able t o  bring in 
other considerations (politics, weather) in a cleanly structured way. 
The SLS allows the structured "pre-digestion" of very difficult judg- 
ments and decisions that  could not be made well in the heat of an 
accident. The net effect would be to decrease hurried, individual human 
accident management judgments made under stress, replacing them with 
more carefully considered judgments made by larger numbers of people 
over longer periods of time. 
The SLS would provide an  appropriate avenue for openness with 
government and the  media, and so would help prevent the loss of credibil- 
ity that  so complicated the TMI accident (see Kemeny 1979, Rogovin 
1980). In sum, the SLS would build into the accident management system 
a pre-determined means of describing and reacting to a very uncertain 
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current and future plant status. 
Diff icult ies in Developing t h e  S t a n d a r d  Language S y s t e m  
Some of the major difficulties to be encountered in the development 
of the SLS are as follows: 
1. Operator Stress: The operator will be under severe stress in the 
course of an accident, so the mapping from system parameters 
to paragraphs and keywords must be kept simple, and must use 
only coarse system parameters. 
2. Novel Accidents: No new accident is like any past accident. The 
TMI accident, for example, was quite novel. As a result, the pre- 
determined accident alarm levels were not effective in providing 
timely indications of hazard. I t  follows that  the mapping from 
system parameters to paragraphs and keywords must be kept 
general, and should not be too constrained by preconceived 
notions of what an  accident will look like. 
3 .  Size of Language Vocabulary: The choice of the number of para- 
graphs and keywords to include in the SLS involves a difficult 
balance: the greater  the number of paragraphs, the more gui- 
dance given to the government authority. But as the number of 
paragraphs increases, the more difficult will be the operator 's 
task of choosing among them. 
4. Phrases Used in the Paragraphs: The wording of the paragraphs 
determines the relative d.ifficulty of mapping from system 
parameters to paragraph versus mapping from paragraph to 
countermeasure decision. Paragraphs worded in system status 
terms are easy for the operator to select, but are difficult for 
the government authority to use. Alternatively, paragraphs 
worded in countermeasure terms are difficult for the operator 
to select, but are easy for the authority to use. Ideally, the 
paragraphs should be worded in terms of present and future 
hazard, capturing the information contained in Table I, and 
dividing the judgments required as cleanly as possible: techni- 
cal judgments in mapping from system status to paragraph, pol- 
itical and social judgments in mapping from paragraph to coun- 
termeasure decision. 
5 .  Paragraph to Decision Guide Mapping: The mapping from stan- 
dard paragraph to countermeasure decision guides cannot be 
determined by the technical experts alone. The appropriate 
government authorities also have a responsibility to participate 
in that determination since such a mapping must involve social 
value judgments that only they can make. These guidelines 
should be periodically thought through with the relevant govern- 
ment authorities in the course of maintaining preparedness for 
an accident. 
STEPS IN THE IIEW,LOPMENT OE' AN S1S 
The development of an  SLS represents a very challenging, fas- 
cinating set  of engineering problems. While there are  several ways 
one could go about such a development, one in particular will be 
described here as a way of illustrating the engineering problems 
involved. The first three of the  six steps described below involve the 
identification of classes of radiological loss vs time arrays such as  . 
those presented in Table 1. These arrays will be referred to as loss- 
time arrays. While the particular levels of radiological loss and time 
used are subject to adjustment in the course of the following steps, 
once the most appropriate levels are determined those levels, as row 
and column descriptors, will be the same for all arrays. That is, 
loss-time arrays will only differ in the cell entries, the  probabilities 
that  each loss will be exceeded a t  each time. Six steps in the 
development of an  SLS are now briefly described. 
1. Identification of classes of loss-time arrays discriminable by 
coarse system parameters. 
Once the set of all possible loss-time arrays is identified, it is to be 
partitioned into classes in such a way that  an operator looking a t  
very coarse, general system parameters could most easily tell which 
class includes the array that  best describes the hazard presented by 
the reactor. Another way to describe this task is the partitioning of 
the loss-time arrays into classes such that  coarse, general system 
parameters a re  most apt  to identify the class of arrays that includes 
the array that  best describes the hazard presented by the reactor. 
T h s  step can be very challenging, as it involves the characterization 
of the reactor system by that set of system parameters that  are  
directly observable and are apt to catch all significant accidents, 
even very novel ones that have not yet been imagined. 
2. Identitication of classes of loss-time arrays that discriminate 
among countermeasure decision guides 
A partition of loss-time arrays on the criterion of Step 1 alone would 
not necessarily lead to a useful set of classes of arrays. The classes 
of arrays ultimately sought are  to form the bases for SLS para- 
graphs. As such they must discriminate among alternative counter- 
measure decision guides. In t h s  Step 2, then, the set  of all possible 
loss-time arrays is to be partitioned into classes in such a way that  a 
government authority looking a t  any of the classes could most easily 
tell which countermeasure decision guide is the most appropriate for 
the .hazard represented by that  class of arrays. Another way to 
describe this task is the partitioning of the loss-time arrays into 
classes such that  each class clearly identifies a most appropriate 
countermeasure decision guide. 
3. Selection of classes of loss-time arrays appropriate as bases for 
SLS standard paragraphs 
The sets of classes identified in the previous two steps can now be 
cornpared to select a set of classes of arrays that combine the 
characteristics sought in each of the two steps. That is, a set  of 
classes of arrays can n.ow be identified where each class is discrimin- 
able from the others by coarse reactor system parameters, and each 
class in turn identifies a different appropriate countermeasure deci- 
sion guide. In addition, it is hoped that the arrays within each of the 
identified classes have enough in common with each other that Step 
4 is feasible. 
4. Develop an english language paragraph and keyword for each 
of the array classes identified in Step 3 
These paragraphs should form a set that retains the characteristics 
of the set of array classes identified in Step 3. That is, each para- 
graph should be discriminable from the others on the basis of coarse 
reactor system parameters, and each paragraph should in turn pro- 
vide unique guidance as to which countermeasure alternatives are 
appropriate. The particular language used in these paragraphs 
should be selected in accordance with the considerations listed in 
point four of the list of difficulties presented above. 
5. Develop clear guidelines for mapping from reactor system 
status to each of the standard paragraphs developed in Step 4. 
6. Develop clear guidelines for mapping from each of the stan- 
dard paragraphs to countermeasure decision guidance. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has focused on a particular problem of nuclear accident 
management: the communication of information concerning the radio- 
logical hazard of a poorly understood accident from technical people on 
site to governmental authorities off site in such a way that  sound counter- 
measure decisions can be made. Current accident management plans do 
not handle tha t  problem well, in that they implicitly assume that  the 
accident is reasonably well understood, at  least understood well enough 
for the operator to provide non-probabilistic radiological release and dose 
estimates. Such plans are not resilient to the confusion and uncertainty 
that  may accompany a nuclear accident such as the one a t  TMI. 
A particular form for on-site/off-site communication of a poorly 
understood accident situation has been proposed here, called a standard- 
ized language system (SLS). The mechanics of such a system involve sim- 
ply a dedicated phone line between technical experts and government 
authorities. The development of such a system would concentrate on the 
keywords passed down that  phone line, and the mappings from system 
status to keyword and from keyword to countermeasure decision gui- 
dance. The value of such a system lies in its ability to encode the highly 
uncertain off-site radiological hazard represented by a poorly understood 
accident in a form that  is usable by the parties at  either end of the line. 
The development of a standardized language sys t em  would represent 
a challenge and opportunity for the engineers involved. It calls for 
creative thnking concerning the behavior of a complex system operating 
in an extremely rare mode. The SLS involves very directly ahd immedi- 
ately the interaction between a complex technology and society, between 
technologists and government authorities. Finally, the development of an 
SLS could contribute substantially to the safety of nuclear power. 
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